

## Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

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P 051102Z JUN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
TO SECSTATE WWASHDC PRIORITY 7523

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 5489

NODIS

DEPT PLEASE REPEAT TO TEHRAN AND PARIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MNUC, EAID, MASS, PEPR, PK, FR, US  
SUBJECT: MANAGING THE REPROCESSING LETDOWN IN PAKISTAN

REF: A) STATE 138075, B) ISLAMABAD 4065, C) STATE 135585,  
D) ISLAMABAD 5321

1. WITH THE FRENCH PLANNING IMMINENTLY TO NOTIFY THE PAKISTANIS OF THEIR DECISION TO CANCEL THE REPROCESSING PLANT CONTRACT, THE COMPLEX CHORE OF MANAGING THE PAKISTANI REACTION IS IMMEDIATELY UPON US. IT SEEMS TO ME APPROPRIATE, THEREFORE, THAT WE QUICKLY REVIEW OUR SCENARIO FOR DETERRING THE GOP FROM RASH, EMOTIONAL, AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE REACTIONS.

2. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT DE GUIRINGAUD IS ACCURATE WHEN HE SAYS THE PAKISTANIS WILL "NEVER RENOUNCE" THE PLANT FORMALLY AND THAT OUR BEST HOPE IS "TO PERSUADE THEM TO DELAY IT INDEFINITELY" (REF A). WITHIN THAT BROAD SCENARIO, HOWEVER, THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT POSSIBLE REACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE PAKS.

3. THE FIRST POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT  
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WILL LET OFF A LOT OF STEAM ABOUT FOREIGN PRESSURES AND INTERFERENCE FROM THE NUCLEAR 'HAVES,' BUT THAT IT WILL STOP SHORT OF COMMITTING ITSELF UNILATERALLY TO FINISHING THE REPROCESSING PLANT. THERE WILL BE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE PAK GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL BREATHE A SILENT SIGH OF RELIEF AT THE NEWS, AND OUR TACTIC SHOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO ASSERT THEMSELVES TO ENSURE THAT THE PAK REACTION

CONSISTS OF NO MORE THAN A STATEMENT OF ACUTE DISAPPOINTMENT, OF THE NEED FOR A REASSESSMENT OF ITS PROGRAM, AND PERHAPS OF RENEWED COMMITMENT TO A NUCLEAR FUTURE FOR PAKISTAN'S ENERGY REQUIREMENTS.

4. EVEN WITH SUCH AN OPTIMAL REACTION, WE MUST EXPECT EMOTIONAL AND ANGRY WORDS TO BE CAST IN OUR DIRECTION; WE WILL HAVE TO FORBEAR THEN, IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR BROADER OBJECTIVES, JUST AS WE WILL HAVE TO AVOID ANY TENDENCY TO COMMEND OURSELVES FOR THE SUCCESS OF OUR POLICY. WE WOULD EXPECT, AMONG OTHER FULMINATIONS (A) RESENTMENT THAT THE USG AND FRANCE HAVE USED PAKISTAN'S NEEDS FOR SUPPORT AGAINST THE AFGHAN THREAT AS LEVERAGE IN PRESSURING THE GOP AND (B) ASSERTIONS BY PRO-BHUTTO ELEMENTS THAT BHUTTO'S CHARGES AGAINST THE USG -- THAT WE ENGINEERED HIS DOWNFALL IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE OUR GOAL OF A WEAK AND LESS ASSERTIVE PAKISTAN -- ARE NOW PROVED TRUE.

5. I FEAR THAT GOP CONCERN OVER AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT BACKLASH WITHIN PAKISTAN WILL PROBABLY ARGUE FOR AN EVEN STRONGER REACTION THAN THAT ABOVE. IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GOP HAS NOT SOLD OUT TO FOREIGN PRESSURES THERE WILL DOUBTLESS BE SOME FORM OF DECLARATION INTENDED TO PERSUADE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ELEMENTS THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT GIVE UP ITS DREAM OF NUCLEAR INDEPENDENCE AND THAT, IF NECESSARY, SECRET

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PAKISTAN IS PREPARED TO GO IT ALONE. WE WILL PROBABLY FIND THEM RELUCTANT TO SOFTEN THIS COMMITMENT, EVEN IN PRIVATE, LEST SUCH SOFTENING LEAK OUT AND BE USED BY PRO-BHUTTO ELEMENTS TO SUGGEST DUPLICITY AND WEAKNESS AND FOREIGN DOMINATION OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. AND THESE CONSIDERATIONS WILL IMPACT ON THEIR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE "PACKAGE" WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT; THE GOP MUST AVOID BEING SEEN BY ITS DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCY AS HAVING SOLD OUT PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR BIRTHRIGHT FOR AID LOANS, PL 480, AND F5-E'S.

6. I RECOGNIZE THAT IN PAINTING THIS SCENARIO, I AM SUGGESTING A SET OF CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH COULD SEVERELY COMPLICATE OUR ABILITY TO MOVE AHEAD WITH ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND THE PROVISION OF SELECTED MILITARY EQUIPMENT. I BELIEVE THE PROBLEMS ARE MANAGEABLE, HOWEVER, IF THEY ARE HANDLED ACCORDINGLY:

(A) AS EARLIER PROPOSED IN REF (B) AND REAFFIRMED BY THE SECRETARY IN REF (A), I SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM THE GOP -- PROMPTLY AFTER GOF DECISION HAS BEEN CONVEYED-- THAT OUR CONTINUING ABILITY TO BE OF ASSISTANCE

IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT  
FIELDS WILL REQUIRE THAT WE CONCLUDE -- TO OUR  
SATISFACTION -- THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT TAKING STEPS TO  
COMPLETE THE REPROCESSING PLANT OR TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS PROGRAM. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD NOT INSIST ON ANY  
ORAL OR WRITTEN UNDERTAKING ON THEIR PART ACCEPTING THIS  
CONDITION, WE WOULD IN FACT BE BASING OUR JUDGEMENTS ON  
THEIR ACTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD.

(B) WE SHOULD BE PREPARED IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS  
WITH THE GOP IN CONCRETE TERMS THE MODALITIES OF OUR  
VARIOUS TYPES OF ASSISTANCE AND TO PRODUCE QUICK  
COMMITMENTS AND AGREEMENTS IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE GOP  
IN HANDLING THE DOMESTIC REACTION.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7524

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 5489

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(C) WITH THE CONGRESS, WE SHOULD ARGUE THAT AN  
INDEPENDENT CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS IN THE USG AND GOF HAS  
RESULTED IN THE CANCELLATION OF THE FRENCH CONTRACT,  
AND THUS THE AVOIDANCE OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD  
TRIGGER THE GLENN AMENDMENT. WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR  
THAT WHILE THERE IS NO IRON-CLAD GUARANTEE THAT THE GOP  
WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO GO IT ALONE ON THE REPROCESSING  
PLANT -- IT WILL CERTAINLY NOT ABANDON THE IDEA FORMALLY --  
AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR

THE GOP TO GO FORWARD WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. WE SHOULD TELL THE CONGRESS, MOREOVER, THAT WE WILL NOT CONTINUE ECONOMIC OR MILITARY ASSISTANCE/SALES IN THE FACE OF HARD EVIDENCE THAT THE PAKS ARE GOING AHEAD; HOWEVER, IT IS ONLY THROUGH CONTINUING OUR SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAT WE CAN KEEP OURSELVES POSITIONED MOST EFFECTIVELY TO PREVENT A HEADLONG GOP EFFORT TO DEVELOP A REPROCESSING/ PLUTONIUM CAPABILITY. WE SHOULD POINT OUT THAT CONTINUED EMBARGO OF MILITARY SALES AND ECONOMIC AID WILL BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

7. THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT WILL BE IN DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC STANCES OF ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS. THE PROBLEM MIGHT BE EASED IF THE FRENCH MAKE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. IN FACT, THE PAKS MAY PLEAD WITH THE FRENCH TO THIS  
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EFFECT WHEN THEY LEARN THE BAD NEWS. IF THE FRENCH ACCEDE, WE MAY BE ABLE TO HANDLE AN AID RESUMPTION AS QUIETLY AS WE DID THE DECISION TO DESIST FROM NEW COMMITMENTS LAST FALL -- THAT IS, WITH A LIMITED NUMBER OF SELECTED CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS AND NO ANNOUNCEMENT.

8. HOWEVER, SHOULD THERE BE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE FRENCH, FOLLOWED BY GOP PUBLIC ASSERTIONS OF ITS DETERMINATION TO MOVE AHEAD ALONE, WE WOULD SURELY BE FACED WITH PRESS QUERIES ON OUR RESUMPTION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. IN DEALING WITH THESE, WE WILL HAVE TO FALL BACK ON BEING TRUTHFUL BUT NOT FORTHCOMING, I.E., POINTING OUT THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF THE GLENN AMENDMENT; THAT IN CONDUCTING A REVIEW OF OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN WE HAVE DECIDED TO RESUME ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; AND THAT WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY.  
HUMMEL

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